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ABSTRACT  
As we increasingly delegate decision-making to algorithms, whether directly or indirectly, important 
questions emerge in circumstances where those decisions have direct consequences for individual 
rights and personal opportunities, as well as for the collective good. This is most evident in the case of 
certain forms of decision-making in the criminal justice system concerning personal liberty, such as 
custody, sentencing and parole determinations, but also applies to access to education, housing, 
social welfare, credit, and insurance. A key problem for policymakers is that the social implications of 
these new methods can only be grasped if there is an adequate comprehension of their general 
technical underpinnings. 
The discussion here focuses primarily on the case of enforcement decisions in the criminal justice 
system, but draws on similar situations emerging from other algorithms utilised in controlling access to 
opportunities, to explain how machine learning works and, as a result, how decisions are made by 
modern intelligent algorithms or ‘classifiers’.  It examines the key aspects of the performance of 
classifiers, including how classifiers learn, the fact that they operate on the basis of correlation rather 
than causation, and that the term ‘bias’ in machine learning has a different meaning to common 
usage. 
An example of a real world ‘classifier’, the Harm Assessment Risk Tool (HART), is examined, through 
identification of its technical features: the classification method, the training data and the test data, the 
features and the labels, validation and performance measures.  Four normative benchmarks are then 
considered by reference to HART: (a) prediction accuracy (b) fairness and equality before the law (c) 
transparency and accountability (d) informational privacy and freedom of expression, in order to 
demonstrate how its technical features have important normative dimensions that bear directly on the 
extent to which the system can be regarded as a viable and legitimate support for, or even alternative 
to, existing human decision-makers. 
It is contended that systems which utilise decision-making (or decision-supporting) algorithms, and 
have the potential to detrimentally affect individual or collective human rights, deserve significantly 
greater regulatory scrutiny than those systems that use decision-making algorithms to process 
objects.  This may seem a truism, yet it appears that the continuing expansion of machine decision-
making in the public and private sectors, often justified on the grounds of efficiency and cost-saving, 
has yet to attract the degree of informed regulatory analysis and evaluation that its problematic merit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent ‘machine learning’ data revolution has not just resulted in game-playing programs like 
AlphaGo, or personal assistants like Siri, but in a multitude of applications aimed at improving 
efficiency in different organizations by automating decision-making processes. These applications 
(either proposed or deployed) may result in decisions being taken by algorithms about individuals 
which directly affect access to key societal opportunities, such as education, jobs, insurance and 
credit.  For, example, job applications are often screened by intelligent software1 for shortlisting, 
before being seen by human recruiters;2 college admissions are increasingly informed by predictive 
analytics,3 as are mortgage applications,4 and insurance claims.5  In those circumstances, individuals 
are usually voluntarily engaging with the organisation utilising the software, although they may not be 
aware of its use (Eubanks 2018).  However, predicative analytics are increasingly in use in 
circumstances where the individual’s engagement with the organisation is largely or wholly 
involuntary, e.g. in areas of State intervention such as child safeguarding and access to welfare 
benefits.6 
A controversial area of application is that of criminal justice, where use of intelligent software may not 
directly impact the wider population, but the outcome of the decisions made are of critical importance 
to both the rights of those subject to the criminal justice system, and to the public’s perception of the 
impartiality and fairness of the process.7  Software tools are already used in US and UK courts and 
correctional agencies8 to support decision-making about releasing an offender before trial (e.g. 
custody and bail decisions), and to determine the nature and length of the punishment meted out to a 
defendant (e.g. sentencing and parole). Such software, usually referred to as ‘risk assessment tools”, 
                                                          
1  A note on terminology: throughout the paper we will use the expressions “intelligent software” and 
“intelligent algorithms” to refer to the products of AI methods and specifically of machine learning.  While 
we will use the terms “machine decision” and “machine decision-making” to indicate the application of 
machine learning techniques to decision-making processes.  
2  The human resource software market includes applicant tracking systems, resume screening tools, talent 
matching and candidate relationship systems. Many companies use proprietary software e.g. JobVite 
(https://www.jobvite.com/) or free applications e.g. MightyRecruiter (https://www.mightyrecruiter.com/), 
which, collect and manage applicants’ data, but can also provide functions for parsing and classifying 
applicants’ resumes. Other software such as Belong (https://belong.co/) can perform more personalized 
search by analysing candidates’ behaviour on social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter. 
3  E.g. consulting firm EAB (https://www.eab.com) provides technological solutions to enable colleges and 
universities to achieve the desired target of applicants, track students’ activities and offer personalised 
advises. Institutions using these, or similar tools, include Georgia State University, 
(https://www.eab.com/technology/student-success-collaborative/ssc-wsj-oct-13), and Saint Louis 
University, which has developed its own data-driven approach for finding successful students in existing 
and new geographic markets (Selingo 2017). 
4  E.g. Experian (http://www.experian.com), one of the largest UK Credit Reference Agencies, is using 
machine learning to approve or deny mortgage applications reducing processing time (see e.g. 
http://www.experian.com/blogs/news/2017/05/25/information-data/). Other lending platforms, like Upstart 
(https://www.upstart.com/) and SoFi (https://www.sofi.com) make their assessment also based on 
applicant’s career and education. For a list of companies using machine learning and AI in lending see 
(Payne 2017)  
5  E.g. SAS (https://www.sas.com/) provides Detection and Investigation for Insurance which uses 
automated business rules, embedded AI and machine learning methods, text mining, anomaly detection 
and network link analysis to automatically score claims records. 
https://www.sas.com/en_us/software/detection-investigation-for-insurance.html  
6  E.g. in the US, Allegheny County was the first jurisdiction to use a predictive-analytics algorithm to identify 
families most in need of intervention (Hurley 2018). See the Allegheny Family Screening Tool 
http://www.alleghenycounty.us/Human-Services/News-Events/Accomplishments/Allegheny-Family-
Screening-Tool.aspx  In the UK “…at least five local authorities have developed or implemented a 
predictive analytics system for child safeguarding. At least 377,000 people’s data has been incorporated 
into the different predictive systems.” (McIntyre & Pegg 2018). 
7  E.g. the case of Eric Loomis in Wisconsin, USA (Liptak, 2017). 
8  For a survey of the tools used in US see Electronic Privacy Information Centre https://epic.org/algorithmic-
transparency/crim-justice/). In UK, for example, see the Harm Risk Assessment Tool examined below. 
Similar tools, such as actuarial methods, have been used in England and Wales since the 1990s and are 
reviewed in a Ministry of Justice (UK) report (Moore 2015).  
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have become the focus of public attention and discussion because of claims about their associated 
risks (Angwin et al. 2016 and Wexler 2017) and benefits.9  
In a democratic society, when a human decision-maker, such as a judge, custody officer, or social 
worker evaluates an individual for the purposes of making a decision about their entitlement to some 
tangible benefit or burden with real consequences for the relevant individual, it is understood that they 
should do so in accordance with a commonly understood set of normative principles, for example: 
• justice (e.g. equality before the law, due process, impartiality, fairness); 
• lawfulness (e.g. compliance with legal rules); 
• protection of rights (e.g. freedom of expression, the right to privacy). 
It is expected that not only will a decision-maker normally act in conformity with those principles, but 
also that the exercise of their decision-making powers can, when challenged, be exposed and 
subjected to meaningful oversight.  This requires that the system within which they operate is subject 
to certain normative obligations, for example, that it is transparent and accountable, and as such 
facilitates public participation and engagement. 
Many decisions will not be subject to specific review or scrutiny processes as a matter of course. 
Thus, the legitimacy of the system within which they are made rests both upon the reliance we are 
willing to place on the decision-makers internalising and applying the normative principles – i.e.  our 
having a rational basis on which to develop trust; and the system’s effective observance of the 
normative obligations which provide the capacity and capability to criticise and question – i.e. our 
having a meaningful ability to exercise distrust. Decision-making systems in which the ability of the 
public to effectively develop trust or exercise distrust is significantly attenuated are likely to be 
perceived as illegitimate, and probably dysfunctional. 
Ensuring that machine decision-making operates in accordance with normative principles, and takes 
place within a system that incorporates normative obligations, will be an important challenge, 
particularly as the precise nature and degree of observance of those principles and obligations may 
vary according to cultural and disciplinary expectations.10 The current generation of intelligent 
algorithms make decisions based on rules learnt from examples, rather than explicit programming, 
and often these rules are not readily interpretable by humans.  There is thus no guarantee that 
intelligent algorithms will necessarily internalise accurately, or apply effectively, the relevant normative 
principles; nor that the system within which they are embedded will have the means to facilitate the 
meaningful exercise of particular normative obligations.  
This chapter focuses on the example of criminal justice, because it highlights many of the concerns 
shared by other applications of machine learning to human decision-making: how are these decisions 
made? How will this impact our ability to develop trust or exercise distrust effectively? What do we 
know about the accuracy, fairness and transparency of such decisions? Can biases affect intelligent 
algorithms, due to their training examples or the conditions in which they are used? What kind of 
analogies might we use to think about these situations? What technical or legal solutions should be 
developed?  
The principle underlying the use of machine decisions, that a score can be used as an indicator of the 
risk that a given person will behave in a certain way over a period of time (e.g. she will commit a 
crime, graduate successfully or fulfil assigned tasks) remains the same for a broad range of uses, 
even if the consequences of a decision vary significantly in context. Depending on the score 
produced, the algorithm triggers a determinate response action such as “detaining an offender” or 
“rejecting a loan application”. But a lack of general understanding of how these algorithms work and 
the impact they may have on people’s lives, combined with limited access to information about 
                                                          
9  For a brief examination of the benefits and risks in criminal justice, see the White House Report on 
Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity, and Civil Rights (2016:19) 
10  E.g. obligations such as transparency and accountability may be more highly valued in some countries, or 
in decision-making systems, than in others; and understanding of the meaning and/or application of terms 
such as ‘privacy’ or ‘equality’ can differ between lawyers, computer scientists and laypersons. 
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software and outcomes, renders such decision-making processes opaque, even as an increasing 
reliance upon algorithms suggests a need for in-depth examination. 
There is a need for discussion of the individual and social consequences of increased reliance on 
machine decision-making, and whether systems predicated upon such consequential decisions can 
support the necessary elements for the development of trust, or exercise of distrust, that are 
fundamental to the legitimacy of the criminal justice process, or to the legitimacy of administrative 
decision-making, when humans play a decreasing (or no) role in the process. The requirements for 
developing trust and exercising distrust in such systems will extend beyond simple guarantees of 
accuracy, to encompass guarantees that they operate according to key normative principles, such as 
justice, lawfulness and protection of specific rights. Such limits might include not making use of 
information that is normatively excluded when reaching a given decision (e.g. the use of ‘gender’ or 
‘sexual orientation’ in recruitment decisions), respecting some pre-determined notion of fairness, and 
providing evidence both about how a decision was reached, and that the system was operated within 
the range of conditions for which it was designed and authorised.  
Four benchmarks derived from the normative principles/objectives, which we consider both common 
to consequential decision-making relating to individuals, and critical to development of appropriate 
trust relations between stakeholders, are used here to exemplify the claim that a knowledgeable 
critical assessment of the interplay of key technical and normative concepts is required for the 
effective and legitimate application of machine decision-making. These benchmarks are accuracy, 
transparency/accountability, fairness/equal treatment, and rights to privacy/free expression.  It is not 
suggested that these are the only possible or necessary benchmarks, but they are arguably the most 
representative elements of the public concerns about the encroachment of technology into social 
structures that permeate the zeitgeist of the ‘big data’ era.  The main objectives here are to demystify 
the technology behind machine decisions, making it comprehensible and accessible to a non-
technical audience, and to suggest how complementary technical and normative perspectives can 
help us to articulate and interlink specific requirements and remedies. 
The following sections describe how a class of algorithms called ‘classifiers’ work (section 2), examine 
how they operate in practice in the Harm Assessment Risk Tool (HART), a real-life implementation in 
the criminal justice sector (section 3) and hypothesise how the four benchmarks might be used to 
effect and evaluate meaningful trust relations between stakeholders in the context of available legal 
and technical remedies (section 4). 
MACHINE DECISIONS: THE TECHNOLOGY   
Machine Learning 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is concerned with the study and design of systems that can perform complex 
actions, such as translating a text, driving a car, blocking unwanted emails, or recommending a book. 
An important type of action routinely performed by intelligent software is that of classification: 
assigning an item to one of many possible categories. This includes, as a special case, the task of 
making discrete decisions:11 for example, about blocking or recommending a web page, or diagnosing 
a patient. While decisions can be made based on various mechanisms, modern AI methods are often 
created by exposing a learning algorithm to large numbers of training examples, a procedure known 
as ‘machine learning’.  
In the language of AI, the properties used to describe the item to be classified are often called 
“features” and the classes that are assigned to each item are called “labels”. So, we could describe an 
email by the words it contains, a patient by the outcome of a set of clinical measurements, a client by 
a set of parameters describing their track record of payments. The labels applied to an email can be, 
for example, ‘spam’ or ‘ham’, those applied to a patient could be ‘diabetic’ or ‘healthy’, those for the 
                                                          
11  The output of a classification algorithm might be considered a decision since it results from choosing 
among a set of categories or a score that puts an item within a certain category. This should be 
distinguished from the consequential decision that usually humans make after consulting algorithmic 
output (e.g. doctor’s decision of requiring further screening to a patient based on the algorithmic output 
classifying that patient into a “malignant tumour” category). 
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loan-client could be ‘safe’ or ‘risky’. The goal of a learning algorithm is to build a function (a 
“classifier”) that assigns a class label (e.g. ‘spam’ or ‘ham’) to any object (e.g. emails) that has not yet 
been labelled.  
Performance of Classifiers 
The performance of any given classifier is defined in terms of the mistakes it makes on new and 
unseen data (called a “test set”), and it can be estimated on a dataset of known cases (called “training 
set”). For example, given a set of emails already labelled as ‘spam’ or ‘ham’, how many errors does 
the classifier make, of each type, when it is run on a set of unlabelled emails? In this two-class 
example, mistakes can be either false positives (e.g. ‘ham’ emails mistakenly classified as ‘spam’) or 
false negatives (e.g. ‘spam’ emails incorrectly labelled as ‘ham’) and can have different costs (deleting 
a valid email might be more costly than keeping an unwanted one). The confusion matrix (see table 1) 
is a data structure that keeps track of the four possible outcomes: 
 True spam True ham 
Predicted spam True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP) 
Predicted ham False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN) 
Table 1: 2x2 confusion matrix 
Future performance is what matters when deploying such a system, and this is where significant work 
has been done in the theory of machine learning: what can past performance tell us about future 
performance? This is typically quantified in terms of probability: the probability of a given type of 
mistake being made, under certain (controllable) conditions.  
In home pregnancy tests the labels are ‘pregnant’ and ‘non-pregnant’ and only one feature is used: 
the concentration of certain hormones in urine. The test can lead to false positives and false 
negatives, each with a different cost (Is it better to miss a pregnancy or to raise a false alarm? This 
depends of course on the usage situation). Past performance of this test on a sample of patients can 
give us information about its future performance, but only under the strong assumption that the 
subjects were selected in the same way. For example, if we test it on teenagers and then we use it on 
middle-age subjects, it might not have similar levels of performance. 
To quantify the probability that a certain type of mistake is made in the future, we need to make some 
assumptions about the source presenting the future items to the classifier, as mistakes can occur with 
different probability. A typical statement that can be made in statistical learning is: if the future data 
are sampled according to a distribution of probability which is the same as that used in the test phase, 
then with high probability the error-rates will be close to those observed in the test phase. 
A technical detail that will be relevant later in this article is that many (but not all) binary classifiers 
work in two steps: first a real valued score is computed for the item to be classified, then that score is 
compared with a threshold, or cut-off point, and the item is assigned to one class or the other, based 
on where it falls. That real valued score could informally be thought of as a probability, though it is not 
necessarily formally a probability. For this specific case, there is an extra consideration: by moving the 
threshold we have a trade-off between false-positives and false-negatives. In the clinical example of 
pregnancy testing this could be captured by the notions of sensitivity or recall (i.e. the true positive 
rate: TP/(TP+FN)) and specificity (i.e. the true negative rate: TN/(TN+FP). 
Other common performance measures are: Overall accuracy ((TP+TN)/(TP+FP+TN+FN)), which tell 
us how often the algorithm classifies items correctly, and precision (i.e. the positive predicted value: 
TP/(TP+FP)), which estimates the fraction of relevant positive instances returned by the algorithm. 
For our case study other relevant metrics are the probability of mistakes: the false discovery rate (i.e. 
the expected proportion of discoveries which are false, FP/(TP+FP)) and the false omission rate (i.e., 
the expected proportion of discoveries which are omitted: FN/(FN+TN)).  
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While this threshold must be set before the system is deployed, when engineers compare the merits 
of different scoring methods they often compare all possible error-rates for all possible thresholds: in 
other words, by moving the threshold from the minimum to the maximum level, they generate pairs of 
true-positives rate (sensitivity) - false positive rate (the probability of false alarm) that are plotted on a 
diagram called a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, whose mathematical properties are 
well known.  
ROC analysis can add further insights into model performance enabling the algorithm designer to 
visualize different trade-offs between the benefits (the true positive rate) and the costs (the false 
positive rate) of a classifier. Often ROC performance is reduced to a scalar value, the so-called area 
under the curve (AUC), which can range between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates a perfect classification 
and 0.5 a random guess.  
Learning to Classify 
In most practical cases, the designers of an AI system decide the features that are used to describe 
an item, and the classes that are available, but they do not design the actual decision function. This is 
automatically generated by a learning algorithm which has access to many training examples: large 
sets of labelled-data which can guide the learning algorithm towards the best configuration of 
parameters, to maximise some measure of performance. This is why the design of automated 
classifiers is really a branch of machine learning,12 and also why training data is such a valuable 
commodity.  
It is important to notice that the system designer makes another important choice: the class of 
possible decision functions that can be output by the system. This may be a very large space, which 
the learning algorithm will have to explore, guided by the training data, but will necessarily be a subset 
of all possible decision functions.  
As the decision function has been selected by an algorithm based on training data, the assessment of 
its performance on new unseen data is particularly important. Statistical Learning Theory13 provides 
guidance for this step: if a classifier is tested on data that was never seen during its training phase 
and is of sufficient size, and it is found to perform well, then we can expect it to perform well on future 
data that was obtained in the same way as the test set.  
The crucial points above are: a) the test set needs to be of sufficient size; b) it should not have been 
used for training; and c) the future data must be obtained in the same way as the test set. Violating 
those requests means that we do not have a reliable assessment of the future performance of the 
classifier.  
For the spam filter, a certain combination of words might appear to be associated with spam emails, 
but on a small test sample this might also be a coincidence. This kind of coincidence becomes more 
probable if the test data was already seen in the training phase (a problem known as ‘overfitting’14), or 
- equally - if changes are made to the classifier in response to the test data.  Finally, even if the 
classifier performs well on a large number of new and unseen test emails, its performance cannot be 
guaranteed if it is applied to a different source of data. For example, if something is found to be 
effective in detecting spam in emails from 1995, it might still fail on emails from 2017.  
It is worth noting that there are many types of functions that can be used to map features to classes. 
The most common ones are based on linear functions (class is predicted based on a score that is a 
linear combination of features), neural-networks (the class-score is a nonlinear function of features), 
                                                          
12  This is the automation of statistical work previously done by actuarial-scientists, statisticians, etc. There is 
a lot of overlap - but with machine learning this happens on a very large scale and in a largely 
autonomous manner, and the effects of the scale, automation, and future development of the field is the 
concern of this article. 
13  Statistical Learning Theory is a mathematical framework for the field of machine learning which became 
popular with the development of the so-called Support Vector Machines (Vapnik 1995) 
14  Overfitting is the result of a statistical model which performs well over the training sample but generalizes 
poorly to new data. Underfitting occurs when the model does not capture the underlying structure of data 
(e.g. when a linear model is applied to non-linearly separable data).   
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decision-trees, and various types of combinations and committees of those. Interpreting how the 
classification function combines the various input features to compute a decision is not an easy task, 
in general, and goes beyond the boundaries of Statistical Learning Theory.  
Correlation vs. Causation 
These important effects (like overfitting) are all related to the key fact that, at present, classifiers make 
predictions based on statistical correlations discovered between the features and the labels 
associated with the training items, not on any causal relations. So, it is possible that a statistical 
relation may disappear if the sampling distribution is changed, or that a spurious relation may appear 
as the result of what statisticians call “multiple testing” – i.e. when testing multiple hypotheses 
simultaneously which are actually non-significant but can produce a significant result just by chance. 
The scoring function will not capture the essence of what makes a spam email but will be able to 
predict - and bet - based on indirect clues that associate with the labels.  
To summarise, overfitting and out-of-domain application are both the result of the system relying on 
associations that appeared to be informative in the training or evaluation stage but are no longer 
informative during the deployment of the system.15  
However, this is also part of the success of machine learning: predictions can be made based on 
combinations of features that somehow end up correlating with the target signal. This is the way in 
which purchase behaviour might be informative about voting intentions,16 and therefore valuable. 
When the machine cannot explain the reasons behind a guess, we cannot interpret its motivations, 
we can only assess its input-output, we talk about a ‘black box’ - the email might have been removed, 
but we will not know why. In other words, machine learning predictions or classifications are educated 
guesses or bets, based on large amounts of data, and can be expected to work subject to certain 
assumptions.  
Often the specific blend of features that happens to correlate with the target signal has no real 
meaning to us. For example, a home pregnancy test is not based directly on the cause of pregnancy, 
but on correlating hormonal factors. However, what if we had a pregnancy test based on email 
content? The frequency of certain expressions might suggest an increased probability of pregnancy 
(e.g. morning sickness) in the general population, but this would not be causal, and the application of 
this general rule to a specific population - say medical students’ inboxes - might fail entirely.17 
On Bias 
The fact that we trust certain correlations, or a class of possible decision functions, largely depends 
on a series of assumptions and inductive bias (Mitchell 1997). The term 'bias' is used with different 
meaning in different contexts. Informally, 'bias' is used to indicate any deviation from neutrality (or 
uniformity), any preference (or preconception), but its technical use in probability, statistics, machine 
learning and social sciences can be very specific. ‘Bias’ is not used in a pejorative way in the STEM 
literature.  
For example, in the theory of probability the term 'bias' is often used to indicate the probability 
associated with a binary event such as a coin toss. The bias of a coin is its probability of landing on 
head, and a coin is called ‘unbiased’ or ‘fair’ when that probability is 1/2. 
                                                          
15  Overfitting was one of the reasons that led Google Flu trends to predict “more than double the proportion 
of doctor visits for influenza like-illness (ILI) than the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)” 
(Lazer et al. 2014: 1203) 
16  E.g. according to Kantar UK Insights: https://uk.kantar.com/ge2017/2017/what-your-shopping-basket-
says-about-how-you-vote/: “ Conservatives buy more products from the alcohol and fresh fish categories” 
whereas “Labour supporters put more toiletries into their trolley”. 
17  However, consider the notorious case where Target, the US discount store, was able to predict a teenage 
girl was pregnant, before her own family knew, based on the analysis of historical purchase data for 
women who had signed up for Target baby registries in the past (Duhigg 2012). Purchase data were 
correlated to pregnancy and so they were able to predict it but, of course, the data played no causal role. 
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In statistics, where we usually estimate a property of a distribution, the notion of bias refers to an 
estimator.18 If the expected value of that estimator is the same as the true value of the quantity being 
estimated, the estimator is said to be unbiased. Sometimes biased estimators are preferred to 
unbiased ones. This occurs when biased estimators, for increasing sample size, converge to the true 
value faster than unbiased ones.  
In machine learning a related concept is used: learning a concept from a finite sample requires 
making some assumptions about the unknown concept, so as to reduce the search space, and 
reduce the risk of overfitting the training set. This is done by knowingly introducing a bias in the 
system, that is a preference for a certain type of outcome.19 For example, we can force a spam filter 
to only use linear combinations of word frequencies, or to prefer simple decision rules, thus reducing 
the options of the learning algorithm. Occam’s razor, the principle that the simplest hypothesis is to be 
preferred, all else being equal, is a classic example of bias in machine learning. 
MACHINE DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Risk Assessment Tools 
The development of risk assessment tools has an established tradition in criminal justice and, since 
the early eighties, actuarial methods have been used to inform decision-making in correctional 
institutions (Feeley & Simon 1994). In the justice system, risk assessment tools are used to measure 
the future behavioural risk posed by a defendant and to inform a variety of decisions at different steps 
of the criminal justice process and in several types of crime. For example, risk assessment tools have 
been deployed in pretrial release,20 in parole and probation21 (i.e. to identify the most appropriate 
supervision) and criminal sentencing.22 There are also tools developed for specific types of crimes, 
such sex offences,23 youth delinquency24 or domestic violence.25 
In this section we will review the Harm Assessment Risk Tool (Urwin 2016 and Barnes 2016), as a 
recent example drawn from a huge literature26 and, most importantly, as a concrete application of 
machine decision-making. In the light of the technical descriptions outlined in the previous section, we 
will try to point out the main components of the tool, i.e. the classification method, the features used, 
the training and the test sets, the implied assumptions and the performance measures.  
The Harm Assessment Risk Tool (HART) 
                                                          
18  E.g. if we are estimating the expectation of a random variable based on a finite sample, the estimator 
might be the average of that sample.  
19  It is known in machine learning that without such a learning bias the general problem of learning from 
finite data is ill-posed. See the so-called “inductive learning hypothesis” (Mitchell 1997). 
20  The Public Safety Assessment tool, developed by Laura and John Arnold Foundation 
(http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/) is used by 21 jurisdictions including three entire states, i.e. Arizona, 
Kentucky and New Jersey (Christin et al. 2015) 
21  The Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) which has been 
developed by a for-profit company, Northpointe (now Equivant), is one of the most popular risk 
assessment tools in USA (http://www.equivant.com/solutions/inmate-classification)  
22  Pennsylvania is in the process of extending the use of risk assessment tools for sentencing decisions 
(Barry-Jester et al. 2015) and, interestingly, also the state of Wisconsin is using COMPAS for sentencing 
(Tashea 2017). 
23  Static-99/R is the most widely used sex offender risk assessment instrument in the world and is used 
extensively in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and many European nations. For 
more details see the website: www.static99.org  
24  Many risk assessment tools offer versions for young offenders, such as COMPAS 
(http://www.equivant.com/solutions/case-management-for-supervision) and the Violence Risk Scale 
(http://www.psynergy.ca/VRS_VRS-SO.html).  
25  The Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA) predicts the risk of future domestic violence 
http://odara.waypointcentre.ca/ and is available for police, victim support and health services. It was 
developed by the Ontario Provincial Police and the Research Department at Waypoint. Other similar tools 
are the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide Revised (see the official website http://www.vrag-r.org/) and the 
Domestic Screening Violence Inventory (see Williams & Grant 2006) . 
26  See examples in footnotes 4 and 15-20. 
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Launched in May 2017 to extensive media coverage(e.g. Baraniuk 2017, Sulleyman 2017), the Harm 
Assessment Risk Tool (HART) is an application developed by Durham Constabulary and Cambridge 
University to support police officers with custody decisions27. The model predicts the likelihood that an 
offender will commit a serious offence (high risk), non-serious offence (moderate risk), or no offence 
(low risk), over a two-year period after the current arrest.    
The Classification Method 
HART is built using random forests, a machine learning method that results from the combination of 
hundreds of decision trees (Oswald et al. 2018 and Urwin, 2016).  A decision tree is a popular 
algorithm where classification can be thought of as a series of if-then rules (Mitchell 1997: 52). Each 
node of the tree tests some attribute of the item to be classified (e.g., age, gender, years in jail, etc.) 
and each descending branch represents a possible value for the considered attribute/node (e.g. for 
gender there might be two values: “female” or “male”, for age there might be some predefined 
intervals such as “0-18”, “19-30”, “31-50” and so on). Starting from the root, each instance is sorted at 
each node based on the value taken by the specified attribute moving down until a leaf, i.e. the 
terminal node containing a class label, is reached. Usually, we refer to classification trees when the 
labels take discrete values (‘Yes’ / ‘No’ answers or integers) while we talk about regression trees 
when the labels take continuous values (usually real numbers).  
Random forests construct a multitude of decision trees trained on random subsamples of the training 
set and using a random subset of features. Predictions of each individual tree can be averaged (with 
regression trees) or aggregated by taking the majority vote (in the case of classification trees). HART 
consists of 509 decision trees, each one producing a separate forecast that counts as one vote out of 
509 total votes and outputs the forecast that receives the most votes (Oswald et al. 2018 and Urwin, 
2016).  
A key feature of random forests is the out-of-bag error, which provides an estimate of the 
generalization error during the training phase. When a random sample is drawn to grow a decision 
tree a small subset of data is held out (usually one third of the sample) and used as a test set of that 
tree. This process, commonly known as “Out of Bag (OOB) sampling”, is used internally, during the 
run of the model, to estimate an approximation of model accuracy.  
Another property is the ability to balance different types of errors, so that mistakes with highest costs 
occur less frequently than those less costly. For example, classifying a future serious offender into a 
lower risk category (false negative, i.e. someone classified as low-risk who commits a crime in the 
follow-up period) is considered costlier than misclassifying a non-serious offender into a high-risk 
category (false positive, i.e. someone flagged as high risk who does not commit any crime in the 
follow-up period)28. In HART these two errors are termed “dangerous error” and “cautious error” 
respectively (Oswald et al. 2018: 227 and Urwin 2016: 43) and their costs vary accordingly. 
As Oswald et al. (2018) pointed out, the set-up of cost ratios is a policy choice that was taken prior to 
the model’s construction with the involvement of senior members of the Constabulary. In these 
respects, HART intentionally prefers (i.e., applies a lower cost ratio to) false positives (the so-called 
cautious error) over false negatives (the so called dangerous errors). In this way, “the model produces 
roughly two cautious errors for each dangerous error.” (Oswald et al. 2018: 227) 
The Training and the Test Sets 
The training dataset is composed of 104,000 custody events from a period between January 2008 
and December 2012. A custody event is defined as “the disposal decision taken by the custody officer 
following arrest at the end of the first custody period” (Urwin 2016: 37). The output of a custody 
                                                          
27  HART was introduced as part of the Checkpoint programme, an initiative within Durham Constabulary 
which aims to reduce reoffending by offering moderate risk offenders an alternative to prosecution. See 
(Oswald et al. 2018) and Durham Constabulary website: https://www.durham.police.uk/Information-and-
advice/Pages/Checkpoint.aspx) 
28  From a technical point of view a way to build the costs of classification errors is to alter the prior 
distribution of the outcomes so as to reflect the desired policy. For example, suppose that 30% of the 
offenders in the training set “fail” and 70% do not. By this procedure the prior proportions can be changed 
so that failures are made relatively more numerous (Berk 2012). 
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decision could be: “to bail (conditional or unconditional), remand in custody, taken no further action, 
administer an out of court disposal/diversion scheme or prosecute the suspect with a decision to bail 
(conditional or unconditional)” (Urwin 2016: 37)29.  
The model was validated in two steps. A preliminary validation has been made with the 
aforementioned “Out of Bag sampling” procedure, thus with random samples of the construction 
(training) dataset. A more recent validation (Urwin 2016) has been conducted by using a separate test 
set composed of 14,882 custody events occurred in 2013. All data sets were drawn from Durham 
Constabulary management IT system.  
The Features and the Labels 
The training set includes 34 features regarding offenders’ demographics and criminal history (see 
table 2). Note that the feature set also includes two types of residential postcodes. The former 
(“CustodyPostcodeOutwardTop24”) contains the first four characters of the offender’s postcode, while 
the latter (“CustodyMosaicCodeTop28”) can take a value from 28 available codes providing 
information about most common socio-geo demographic characteristics for County Durham.30  
While acknowledging the ethical implications of including offender’s postcode among predictors – this 
could give rise to a feedback loop that may reinforce possible existing biases, so that people living 
within areas targeted as “high risks” would undergo closer scrutiny than those living in other areas 
(more will be said on the dimension of fairness in the following section) -  Oswald et al. (2018) argue 
that the nature of random forests would prevent a single feature, like postcode, from determining the 
entire forecasted outcome31. Yet, Oswald et al. (2018) reported that one of the two postcodes could 
be removed in a later iteration. 
The model uses 3 labels reflecting the classification of offenders: 1) high risk = a new serious offence 
within the next 2 years; 2) moderate risk = a non-serious offence within the next 2 years; 3) low risk = 
no offence within the next 2 years. 
FEATURE DESCRIPTION 
1. CustodyAge Age at presenting custody event 
2. Gender Male or female 
3. InstantAnyOffenceCount Count of any offences at presenting custody event 
4. InstantViolenceOffenceBinary A yes/no binary value is used to define the present 
offence in terms of violence 
5. InstantPropertyOffenceBinary A yes/no binary value is used to define the present 
offence in terms of property offence. 
6. CustodyPostcodeOutwardTop24 The 25 most common 'outward' (first 3-4 characters) 
postcodes in County Durham. If the offender’s 
                                                          
29  Note that the custody events of the training and the test sets are supposed to regard decisions with an 
observable outcome (e.g. “released on bail”) – indeed for those suspects who remain in jail we have no 
observation.   
30  According to Big Brother Watch (2018) the second postcode feature refers to Experian’s Mosaic data. 
Mosaic UK is Experian’s tool providing a classification of UK households relating sociodemographic 
characteristics to postcodes (http://www.experian.co.uk/marketing-services/products/mosaic-uk.html). The 
Mosaic system generates information about typical individuals and families in postcode areas (common 
social types are: “World-Class Wealth”, “Disconnected Youth”, “Low Income Workers”, etc.) Widely used 
for marketing purposes, it can also be used for credit scoring and crime mapping. 
31  Indeed, “algorithms such as random forests are based upon millions of nested and conditionally-
dependent decisions points, spread across many hundreds of unique trees [...] It is therefore the 
combination of variables, and not the variable in isolation, that produced the outputted risk level” (Oswald 
et al. 2018: 228). 
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postcode is outside of County 
7. CustodyMosaicCodeTop28 The 28 most common socio-geo demographic 
characteristics for County Durham 
8. FirstAnyOffenceAge The suspect’s age at first offender regardless of 
juvenile or adult 
9. FirstViolenceOffenceAge The suspect’s age at first violent offence regardless of 
juvenile or adult 
10. FirstSexualOffenceAge The suspect’s age at first sexual offence regardless of 
juvenile or adult 
11. FirstWeaponOffenceAge The suspect’s age at first weapon offence regardless 
of juvenile or adult 
12. FirstDrugOffenceAge The suspect’s age at first drug offence regardless of 
juvenile or adult 
13. FirstPropertyOffenceAge The suspect’s age at first property offence regardless 
of juvenile or adult 
14. PriorAnyOffenceCount The number of offences prior to the presenting offence 
for the suspect 
15. PriorAnyOffenceLatestYears The number of years since any offence– if there is no 
offence history, Null value is returned 
16. PriorMurderOffenceCount The number of murder offences prior to the presenting 
offence for the suspect 
17. PriorSeriousOffenceCount The number of serious offences prior to the presenting 
offence for the suspect 
18. PriorSeriousOffenceLatestYears The number of years since the most recent custody 
instance in which a serious offence was committed – if 
there is no serious offence history then a code of 100 
years is used. 
19. PriorViolenceOffenceCount The number of violence offences prior to the 
presenting offence for the suspect 
20. PriorViolenceOffenceLatestYear
s 
The number of years since the most recent custody 
instance in which a violence offence was committed – 
if there is no violence offence history then a code of 
100 years is 
used. 
21. PriorSexualOffenceCount The number of sexual offences prior to the presenting 
offence for the suspect 
22. PrioriSexualOffencelatestYears The number of years since the most recent custody 
instance in which a sexual offence was committed – if 
there is no sexual offence history then a code of 100 
years is used. 
23. PrioriSexRegOffenceCount The number of sex offender register offences prior to 
the presenting offence for the suspect 
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24. PrioriWeaponOffenceCount The number of weapon offences prior to the 
presenting offence for the suspect 
25. PriorWeaponOffenceLatestYears The number of years since the most recent custody 
instance in which a weapon offence was committed – 
if there is no weapon offence history then a code of 
100 years is used 
26. PriorFirearmOffenceCount The number of firearms offences prior to the 
presenting offence for the suspect 
27. PrioriDurgOffenceCount The number of drug offences prior to the presenting 
offence for the offender 
28. PriorDrugOffenceLatestYears The number of years since the most recent custody 
instance in which a drugs offence was committed – if 
there is no drugs offence history then a code of 100 
years is used 
29. PriorDrugDistOffenceCount The number of drug distribution offences prior to the 
presenting offence for the offender 
30. PriorPropertyOffenceCount The number of property offences prior to the 
presenting offence for the offender 
31. PriorPropertyOffenceLatestYear
s 
The number of years since the most recent custody 
instance in which a property offence was committed – 
if there is no property offence history then a code of 
100 years is used. 
32. PriorCustodyCount The number of custody events prior to the presenting 
offence for the offender 
33. PriorCustodyLatestYears The number of years since the most recent custody 
instance – if there is no custody event history then a 
code of 100 years is used 
34. PriorIntelCount The number of intelligence submissions at nominal 
level. The offender at nominal level will have a unique 
identifier, the submissions are counted within the 
forecasting model 
Table 2: List of features used to train HART (Urwin, 2016) 
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Validation and performance measure  
In Urwin’s validation study (2016), HART’s performance has been assessed with respect to both the 
Out of Bag samples (OOB construction data) and the separate test set (2013 validation data). For 
each dataset a 3 x 3 confusion matrix (see table 3 and 4) keeps track of the standard error measures 
expressed in percent values and conditional to the 3 possible labels (high-risk / moderate-risk / low-
risk).32 
OOB Construction data Actual High Actual Moderate Actual Low Total 
Forecast High 8.12% 6.80%  1.80% * 16.72% 
Forecast Moderate 2.25% 34.09% 12.19% 48.53% 
Forecast Low 0.82% + 7.65% 26.28% 34.75% 
Total 11.18% 48.54% 40.27% 100% = 104,000 
custody events 
Table 3: Confusion Matrix for the training set (see table 7 in Urwin, 2016: 54) 
2013 Validation Actual High Actual Moderate Actual Low Total 
Forecast High 6.26% 10.01%  2.23% * 18.49% 
Forecast Moderate 4.88% 32.53% 13.55% 50.95% 
Forecast Low 0.73% + 5.81% 24.02% 30.55% 
Total 11.86% 48.35% 39.79% 100% = 14,882 
custody events 
Table 4: Confusion Matrix for the test set (see table 8 in Urwin, 2016: 54) 
Among cautious and dangerous errors two notions are distinguished (Urwin, 2016: 54-55): 
− “very dangerous error” = a suspect being labelled as ‘low risk’ commits a serious offence in 
the next 2 years (see cells marked with “+” in table 3 and 4) 
− “very cautious error” = a suspect being labelled as ‘high risk’ does not commit any crime in 
the next 2 years. (see cells marked with “*” in table 3 and 4) 
In the table below, we report some performance measures of HART (see table 5 which was created 
by combining tables 6 and 9 in Urwin, 2016: 52, 56) – note that they can be easily computed by using 
the terminology introduced in the previous section of this chapter. 
  
                                                          
32  Note that the validation study also assessed to what extent the custody officers’ decisions agree with 
HART predictions. Using a separate data set consisting of 888 custody events for the period: 20 Sep. 
2016 - 9 Nov. 2016), the study suggested that the highest level of agreement is in the moderate category, 
at 39.86%, while clear disagreement emerges in the high-risk category – the police and the model agree 
only at 1.58% (Urwin 2016: 71-72). 
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OOB 
construction 
data 
2013 
validation 
data  
Overall accuracy: what is the estimated 
probability of a correct classification? 
68.50% 62.80% 
Sensitivity / recall: what is the true positive 
rate for each class label?  
72.60% 52.75% HIGH 
70.20% 67.28% MODERATE 
65.30% 60.35% LOW 
Precision: what is the rate of relevant instance 
for each class label? 
48.50% 33.83% HIGH 
70.20% 63.84% MODERATE 
75.60% 78.60% LOW 
Very dangerous errors: of those predicted low 
risk, the percent that was actually high risk 
(subset of the false omission rate) 
2.40% 2.38% 
 
Very cautious errors: of those predicted high 
risk, the percent that was actually low risk 
(subset of the false discovery rate) 
10.80% 12.06% 
Table 5: some performance measures of HART extracted from tables 6 and 9 in Urwin (2016: 52,56) 
To the best of our knowledge, ROC analysis and the AUC value are not provided in the validation 
study (Urwin 2016). 
OPERATIONALISING TRUST: FOUR NORMATIVE BENCHMARKS FOR MACHINE DECISION-
MAKING 
As noted above, HART is a case study drawn from a wider reality and, in addition to criminal justice, 
many other domains are reframing routine decisions in machine learning terms (education, 
recruitment, health care, government, etc). This reframing is premised on the fact that machine 
learning captures the general mechanism underlying common “diagnostic questions” (Swets et al, 
2000): Will this person commit violence? Will this student succeed?  Will this candidate meet current 
and future company’s needs? Which costumers will best match your business? Which persons will be 
more likely to develop depression? Which citizens should be prioritised in tax exemption? Usually all 
these questions call for a positive or negative decision about the occurrence of future event (student’s 
success, employee’s achievements, the rise of depression…) or the presence of specific conditions 
(e.g. for accessing a tax reduction programme or other public services).   
Many argue that a thoughtful application of machine learning to (diagnostic) decisions might improve 
public policy (Kleinberg et al. 2016). But, while the study of the effective advantages of machine 
decisions need further investigation,33 the overall assessment of these technologies should extend 
                                                          
33  E.g. on one hand, Kleinberg et al. (2017) showed that machine learning could provide important economic 
and welfare gains in bail decisions, on the other, Dressel & Farid (2018) revealed that machine learning 
algorithms (e.g. COMPAS), when applied to pretrial decision-making, are no more accurate and fair than 
untrained (Mechanical Turk) workers. Urwin (2016) also addressed the problem of human vs. machine 
predictions, but the results of such analysis are not yet available as the forecasts were made in 2016 and 
the follow-up period has not yet passed (see the written evidence submitted by Sheena Urwin, Head of 
Criminal Justice at Durham Constabulary, in relation to the enquiry into Algorithms in Decision-Making of 
the Science and Technology Committee, House of Commons, UK: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-
technology-committee/algorithms-in-decisionmaking/written/78290.pdf) .  
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beyond accuracy guarantees. When machine learning software evaluates an individual for the 
purposes of making a decision about their entitlement to some tangible benefit or burden, the 
operating procedures and consequences of their use should be evaluated according to the principles 
and values of democratic society. 
In the following sections we will examine four benchmarks derived from the normative 
principles/objectives discussed above that may help stakeholders, including practitioners and citizens, 
answer the following question: How does one create an effective trust framework (e.g. one that 
permits rational development of trust and efficient exercise of distrust) that will legitimise the 
augmentation, or replacement, of human decision-making by machine decision-making? These 
benchmarks are derived from established normative principles and reflect the primary factors in the 
contemporary debate surrounding the quality of machine decisions. We believe these could form the 
basis of minimum requirements for legitimating the use of machine decision-making and, hence, set a 
standard for current and future applications. The benchmarks are explored here in the light of the 
HART case study, but their use as an analytical tool to inform regulatory theorising is extensible 
beyond the criminal justice sector, and has potential for cross-domain application. 
Prediction Accuracy 
As discussed above, there are many ways to quantify the performance of a classifier and various 
aspects to consider when model accuracy is reported. Two important pieces of information are: which 
performance measure is used (e.g. overall accuracy? ‘area under the curve’ (AUC)?); and how was 
this measured (how large was the test or validation set; how was it formed?). Let us consider these 
questions in the light of our running example.  
HART was validated by using two datasets: the construction sample (used also for training) and the 
validation sample (not used for training). The validation study provided several measures such as 
overall accuracy, sensitivity, precision and the expected probability of two specific mistakes, i.e. “very 
dangerous” and “very cautious errors”.34 
When comparing model performances with the two datasets (i.e. training and test sets) the 
classification accuracy declines (see Urwin 2016:50-52). This holds for both overall accuracy which 
falls from 68.50 % (in the OOB construction data) to 62.80% (in the 2013 validation data), and 
sensitivity (the true positive rate) which gets worst with the high-risk category (it passes from 72.60% 
to 52.75%). So, one might ask whether using HART provides real advantages (greater accuracy) with 
respect to a more trivial decision mechanism (the so-called “baseline”): Would it perform better than a 
random guesser? Computing the prediction of a random baseline we observe that HART sensitivity 
would be definitely more accurate. If the percent of actual outcomes is known the accuracy of a 
random baseline can be calculated by using the rules of probability. 
We denote Y as the actual outcome and Ŷ as the prediction of a random guesser which is picked from 
the population of the 2013 validation dataset (comprising 11.86 % of high risk, 48.35% of moderate 
risk and 39.79% low risk offenders). Then the accuracy of the random guesser is:  
[P(Y = “high”) * P(Ŷ= “high”)] + [P(Y = “moderate”) * P(Ŷ= “moderate”)] + [P(Y = “low”) * P(Ŷ= “low”)] = 
[0.1186 * 0.1186] + [0.4835 * 0.4835] + [0.3979 * 0.3979] = 0.406 = 41% 
The decline of accuracy might relate to the differing of offender samples (i.e. OOB construction 
sample vs. 2013 validation sample) – indeed the frequency of serious crimes increased between 2013 
and 2015.35 Thus, it might be the case that HART captured statistical relations that were more 
effective in classifying offenders in the training set, but that were less significant in the test set.  
As we have seen before, the statistical associations found in the training phase might also become 
less informative because of an out-of-domain application, i.e. when sampling conditions vary. In the 
case of criminal justice, we might ask: Are judges’ decisions made in the same way? Did they predict 
the same outcome? have the regulatory bodies practices changed (rules, police routines, etc.)? For 
                                                          
34  For an extensive account of the metrics computed, see Urwin (2016) 
35  See the percentages of recorded crimes in Urwin (2016: 47). 
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instance, a risk assessment tool trained on a population of parolees might not be appropriate to 
inform bail decisions (the two populations have different characteristics: usually parolees have already 
spent time in jail) and thus provide poor or wrong predictions (Berk 2012). Note that in the case of 
HART these problems might be kept under control if, as Oswald et al. (2018) reported, the data are 
drawn only from the Durham Constabulary system and not from other sources, such as local agencies 
in Durham or national IT systems. 
The characterization of a model’s performance, as we have noted above, depends also on the fact 
that not all mistakes are equal: for binary classifiers, one would need to separate the effect of false 
positives and false negatives; for multi-class classifiers, there would be many combinations and types 
of error, potentially each with different cost. For example, HART’s developers have deliberately 
weighted more false negatives than false positives. This, as Oswald et al. (2018) stressed, is a policy 
choice rather than a design strategy reflecting specific social needs and preferences (e.g. that of 
safeguarding citizens from potential harms). This choice is reflected in HART’s performance: The 
percent of very dangerous errors is lower than that of very cautious errors and the former remains the 
same in both datasets (very cautious errors slightly increase).36  
Fairness and Equality  
The findings of ProPublica’s analysis (Larson et al. 2016) suggested that the use of risk assessment 
tools might bring about social discrimination.37 Social disparities are not new in on-line advertising 
(Sweeney 2013, Datta et al. 2015) and computer systems (Friedman & Nissenbaum 1996).  
All these findings naturally raise questions for machine decision-making: can AI systems 
discriminate? How do they do it? Which technical, legal and social remedies exist to avoid algorithmic 
discrimination? Which criteria can help us to inform such remedies? 
A basic intuition underlying the notion of fairness is that all human beings must be treated equally 
before the law. This idea is deeply rooted in human rights documents which acknowledge that “all are 
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination” (UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Article 7). Generally, we consider fairness as a comparative notion:38 what counts for a person is to be 
treated equally with respect to other people who are subject to the same procedure. Thus, when a 
person or a group is unjustifiably differentiated and, because of this, put in unfavourable conditions, 
they are discriminated against.  
What discrimination is and how it occurs is a controversial issue. Often the law, rather than providing 
a definition, prefers to indicate a non-exhaustive list of prohibited attributes that cannot be used to 
ground decisions in various settings (such as housing, education, employment, insurance, credit, 
etc.). Typically, the list includes: race, colour, sex, religion, language, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.39 These attributes are then used to 
characterise groups of people which are recognised as important to the structure of a society and, 
hence, worthy of a special protection (“protected groups”).  
                                                          
36  Specifically, “the model was able to ensure the likelihood of very dangerous errors occurring was just 2%. 
Therefore, the organisation can be 98% sure that a very dangerous error will not occur.” (Urwin, 2016: 
85). Technically speaking, this result says that 98% of the time that the model predicts somebody as low 
risk, they will not commit a serious crime (see the Cambridge Centre for Evidence-Based Policing video: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zc8x5P7suuo&feature=youtu.be) Hence, she/he will be a moderate or 
low-risk offender. This is not the same as the media claim that “forecasts that a suspect was low risk 
turned out to be accurate 98% of the time” (Baraniuk 2017). 
37  In short, the analysis found that COMPAS made more mistakes with black defendants as compared to 
their white counterparts, i.e. the false positive rate was higher with black defendants and the false 
negative rate was higher with white defendants. 
38  For an alternative view, see also Hellman (2016). 
39  These characteristics are referred to, in the context of non-discrimination, in international human rights 
documents such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 26), and European 
Convention on Human Rights (Article 14). Most are also to be found in international data protection 
agreements, e.g. The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Article 6), and the EU General Data Protection Regulation (Article 
9), as personal data to which special safeguards should be applied. 
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Algorithmic discrimination40 can arise at different stages of the design process (Barocas & Selbest 
2016). For instance, when forms of social bias are incorporated in the training data, the classifier is 
likely to reproduce the same bias (see, for example, Caliskan et al. 2017 for the case of language).41 
Other pitfalls might be found during the feature selection process - when sensitive attributes in the 
feature set correlate to a classification outcome (e.g. when gender attribute is systematically 
associated to lower paid jobs)42 - and sampling - when certain protected groups are underrepresented 
as compared to others.43 
Building fair (or non-discriminating) algorithms supposes the implementation of an equality principle 
which can be intended in various ways. From a purely formal point of view, equality is achieved when 
alike cases are treated as alike44. From a social perspective, equality is concerned with the 
distribution of goods and services. Its meaning has been specified in two competing conceptions: 
− Equality of outcomes: everyone should receive the same levels of good or services. A 
straightforward example is the ideal that all receive the same income. 
− Equality of opportunities: everyone should have the same chances of success irrespective of 
sensitive attributes or those that are irrelevant for the task at hand. 
These principles inspire different fair practices. For example, a system of quotas (e.g. jobs for specific 
groups) would enforce equality of outcomes; a system that screens CVs only based on relevant 
attributes would enforce equality of opportunities. The same holds true also for the development of 
non-discriminating algorithms where different fairness criteria relate to different notions of equality.  
A technical measure that relates to equality of outcomes is statistical or demographic parity. The latter 
requires that the portion of individuals classified as positive (e.g. “hired” or “high risk offenders”) is the 
same across the groups (e.g. ‘male’ and ‘female’). However, statistical parity is subject to several 
objections since ensuring the same portion of positive outcomes among groups does not guarantee 
the same level of accuracy, i.e. when there is an imbalance in the training set, the algorithm will learn 
and perform better with member of the overrepresented group (Dwork et al. 2012 and Hardt 2016). 
Moreover, a system of quotas might not be desirable in certain contexts such as that of criminal 
justice (Chouldechova 2017).  
On the other hand, the implementation of equality of opportunity requires an in-depth consideration of 
how the classifier behaves across the groups (e.g. is the error rate the same across the groups? Is 
precision or sensitivity the same?). For example, popular metrics are:45 
− Calibration which requires that the fraction of relevant instances among positive predicted 
outcomes (e.g. the fraction of predicted “high-risk” offenders which are indeed “high-risk”) is 
the same across the groups. In other terms this notion requires equal precision across the 
groups.  
                                                          
40  For a survey on this topic, see also Romei & Ruggeri (2013) and Zliobate (2015). 
41  Caliskan et al. (2017) have documented how standard natural language processing tools, which are 
trained on large corpora derived from the Web, reflect the same implicit bias found in language by the 
Implicit Association Test. For instance, European American names are more likely than African American 
names to be associated with pleasant terms - e.g. health, peace, honest, etc.- than unpleasant terms - 
e.g. abuse, murder, accident, etc.  
42  Note that a sensitive attribute can be redundantly encoded in other features. Thus, the algorithm may 
discover these encodings even if the sensitive attribute has been removed. For example, even though the 
gender attribute is dropped from the feature set, other attributes encoding gender (e.g. “cooking”, 
“shopping”, “family”, “children”) may correlate to jobs with lower salaries. 
43  If we have sample size disparities (i.e. a social group is overrepresented), the algorithm will learn 
statistical correlations that will badly transfer to the minority group (Hardt 2014). For example, if a credit 
score algorithm is trained on a dataset which disproportionally represents a segment of the population 
(e.g. “Caucasian individual with long credit history”), it could be error-prone on underrepresented groups 
(e.g. “Hispanic individuals with short credit history”). Similar effects were found in computer vision 
algorithms (see Dwoskin 2015 for a review). 
44  This principle has been formulated by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. For an extensive account of 
the notion of equality, see Gosepath (2011). 
45  For an extensive account of available metrics based on accuracy measures, see Berk et al. (2017). 
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− Equalized odds (Hardt et al. 2016) which, roughly speaking, enforces that the true positive 
rate is equally high in all groups. This corresponds to require equal levels of sensitivity and 
specificity in all groups.46 
− Error rate balance (Chouldechova 2017) which requires that the classifier produces equal 
false positive and false negative rates across the groups. This is comparable to requiring 
equal misclassification rates (see the notion of disparate mistreatment in Zafar et al. (2016) 
and balance for positive and negative class (Kleinberg et al. 2017). Note that controlling the 
error rate balance is complementary to the notion of equalized odds. 
Note that, all these notions, being comparative, require information about the size of the protected 
groups within the dataset (e.g. how many “women” and “men”). In the case of HART this information 
was not provided, and so no conclusion can be drawn. 
Overall, the literature discussing these notions pointed out that it is impossible to satisfy multiple 
criteria at the same time. For example, Kleinberg et al. (2016) showed that there is no method to 
satisfy simultaneously calibration and the balance for positive class and the balance for the negative 
class. Similar conclusions were achieved by Chouldechova (2017), which considered the specific 
case of risk assessment tools, and Berk et al. (2017). 
Transparency and Accountability 
Transparency is a desirable property of legal and administrative systems.  It can be understood as the 
right of citizens to access information about the procedures and data which lead to certain decisions 
affecting them.  It is beneficial for several reasons: on the one hand, it can help organisations to 
account for the performed tasks, i.e. keeping track of the entire process that has led to a specific 
output (accountability), and, on the other, it can support citizens in understanding and questioning 
processes and outcomes (participation) .  
While a right to transparency may not be explicitly expressed in human rights documents such as the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights and European Convention on Human Rights, it is arguable that 
without transparency as a penumbral, or background right, it would be difficult for an individual to 
ensure that those rights that are explicitly protected have been respected.  Modern data protection 
legislation is explicit about the need to observe a principle of transparency in personal data 
processing (e.g. EU GDPR Recital 58 and Article 12; Council of Europe Draft Protocol amending the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
Article 7). 
The idea of transparency often implies an oversight body (e.g. audit commission or regulatory office) 
that can shed light on potential abuses or discriminations and, if necessary, motivate corresponding 
sanctions. For example, under the EU GDPR, ensuring compliance with transparency obligations will 
be part of the responsibility of an organisation’s data protection officer, and will be subject to scrutiny 
by national supervisory authorities. 
Usually transparency supports the design of accountable systems which allow one to detect 
responsibilities when some failures occur (e.g. when some records are lost or when they contain 
errors). Although transparency and accountability refer to distinct problems (what is called ‘inscrutable 
evidence’ and ‘traceability’ respectively in Mittelstadt et al. (2016) they are both directed at the 
diagnosis of potential or actual harms caused by a decision system. Indeed, when information is 
accessible and open to scrutiny it should be easier to understand where and why harms arise (i.e. 
doing system debugging) and, most importantly, who should be held responsible for them (Mittelstadt 
et al. 2016) 
In the context of machine decisions, disclosing information may introduce new problems (Kroll et al. 
2017). For example, if key factors, such as features and labels, are revealed, it may become possible 
to ‘game the system’ by seeking to alter variables that might influence the final output (see, e.g. 
search engine optimisation). Other obvious concerns arise from the publication of the dataset where 
                                                          
46  In a binary classifier when the aim is to identify a “favourable” outcome (e.g. “admission” or “release”, etc.) 
this notion is called “equal opportunity”. 
19 
 
sensitive information is used as input. However, the disclosure of the system’s source code, while it 
may impact legitimate commercial interests (i.e. protecting a competitive advantage), does not 
necessarily imply transparency in the sense of intelligibility of the process or outcomes. Source code 
is usually incomprehensible to non-experts and even experts may not be able to predict algorithm 
behaviour just by examining the code (Kroll et al. 2017). 
In addition, when approaching the transparency of machine decisions, we face another challenge that 
does not simply relate to the ability of reading a piece of code, but it refers instead to the mismatch 
between data-driven machine learning methods and the demands of human interpretation (Burrell, 
2016). Since machine learning methods are designed to discover subtle correlations, and not to 
understand the causes behind any phenomenon being studied, the resulting classifiers often take the 
form of complicated formulae that are not explainable to the general user. While it is true that these 
formulae can be proven to be predictive and, under certain assumptions, even optimal, it is not 
possible for an individual decision to be explained. A random forest, a boosted-combination of trees, 
or even a linear combination, cannot provide a unvarnished explanation for a citizen whose liberty has 
been denied by the algorithm.  
Returning to the HART case study, it would be unfeasible for a human being to look for an 
explanation in nearly 4.5 million nested and conditionally-dependent decision points spread across 
many hundreds of unique trees (Oswald et al. 2018). Paraphrasing Burrell (2016), we might say that 
when HART learns and builds its own representation of a classification decision, it does so without 
regard for human comprehension. So, even if a learnt representation was available it would be 
extremely difficult, even for an expert, to fully understand and interpret the decision process (e.g. to 
understand the impact of a specific feature).   
In recent years the research community has developed several ways to characterise and improve the 
transparency of machine decisions (Lipton 2016). Some of these amount to post-hoc interpretations, 
i.e. separate models which furnish verbal justifications or more simple representation of algorithmic 
output (e.g. visualisation of active nodes in a neural network). Other approaches try to justify a 
decision by reporting analogous cases (i.e. a model generating examples that are similar). An 
alternative strategy is to build systems that ensure procedural regularity, by verifying that an 
automated decision meets specific policy goals through software verification and cryptographic 
techniques (Kroll et al. 2017). 
As well as technical remedies, transparency might be supported by sectoral laws, such as the US Fair 
Credit Reporting Act 1970  (through the creation and maintenance of a consumer report), or by laws 
of general application such as the EU GDPR, which acknowledges the right of the data subject to 
access personal data which have been collected concerning them (Article 15), and requires data 
controllers to implement appropriate measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms 
and legitimate interests, including the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller 
(Article 22 and Recital 71).  
Informational privacy and freedom of expression 
The type of input data in risk assessment tools like HART largely reflect information that police 
officers collect about inmates at specific steps of the justice process (e.g. at intake), such as a 
suspect’s demographics and criminal history.47 This data collection is mandated and/or supported by 
legislative provisions, but the ability to integrate heterogeneous sources of information and other 
social factors (e.g. greater levels of perceived vulnerability among citizens) might suggest further 
directions. For example, in New Orleans a software program (owed by Palantir) is in use by the police 
department to identify connections between individuals and gang members by analysing both criminal 
histories and social media activity (Winston 2018).  This has implications for both privacy and freedom 
of expression – if individuals are aware of the fact that their behaviour or interactions with others may 
be used to make predictions about them and that consequential decisions may be made about them 
as a result of those predictions, they may be caused to consciously or subconsciously alter those 
                                                          
47  The business of risk assessment tools is associated with the development of information management 
systems (sometimes the former is considered an extension of the latter, see e.g. CourtView Justice 
Solutions: http://www.courtview.com/court)   
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behaviours and interactions.  In the case of the New Orleans example, this might involve possible 
targets not using social media, or changing the style or content of their communication with the 
consequence of ‘silencing’ them or restricting their ability to communicate effectively.  
The use of personal data in machine decision-making raises serious privacy concerns: what data are 
admissible? In which contexts? Should public expressions of a citizen be permitted to be used as part 
of computing his risk or credit score? More generally, can personal private online activities be used as 
an element in assessing the score of individuals? Might this directly or indirectly undermine their right 
to expression? 
The right to (informational) privacy is commonly reframed as the “right to control over personal 
information”48 which refers to each piece of data that can be linked to a person (“data subject”) such 
as date of birth, social security number, fingerprint, etc.49  Note that when personal data refers to 
intimate aspects of life or valuable information such as ethnicity, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, biometric data, sexual orientation, etc. is also called “sensitive data”.   
From a technical standpoint, the field of computer science has been developing privacy enhancing 
technologies for many years, for instance, introducing privacy concerns in data release and 
processing (e.g. k-anonymity and differential privacy) or addressing the problem of data disclosure in 
social networking platforms. All these efforts have produced an exceptional stock of tools for those 
who would be willing to take up privacy by design50 and, considering the growing concerns about 
information privacy and security, we would expect further progress on this camp. 
The simplest method to tackle privacy is to de-identify data, i.e. to remove, generalize or replace with 
made-up alternatives explicit identifiers such as name, social security number, address, phone 
number, etc. (Sweeney, 1997). Unfortunately, deidentification is often a limited solution since the 
combination of de-identified databases with other publicly available data (“auxiliary information”) can 
reveal subjects’ identity or reduce uncertainty on a subset of subjects in the dataset.51 
Another technical approach is provided by the model of k-anonymity (Sweeney 2002), a property that 
characterizes the degree of privacy protection in the release of a database. Roughly speaking, k-
anonymity requires that every combination of the values reported in the data released can be 
indistinctly matched to at least k individuals in the database. However, k-anonymity also presents 
some weaknesses as it assumes restrictions on auxiliary information (i.e. an attacker’s knowledge 
may be greater than what is supposed to be) and does not perform well in high-dimensional datasets 
(Narayanan & Shmatikov 2008).  
Contrary to traditional models, the framework of differential privacy (Dwork 2006) shifts the focus from 
database to computation by drawing on randomized response in the structured interview (a technique 
that allows study participants to answer embarrassing questions while maintaining confidentiality). 
Differential privacy aims at the same time to maximize the accuracy of data analysis and minimize the 
risk of re-identification. Given a database and a series of queries, differential privacy ensures that 
“that any sequence of outputs (responses to queries) is “essentially” equally likely to occur, 
independent of the presence or absence of any individual” in the database (Dwork 2014). Note that 
while the theoretical research has rapidly grown, the concrete application of differential privacy started 
more recently.52 
                                                          
48  For a different account of privacy, see Nissenbaum (2010) 
49  In the EU legal terms personal data indicates “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person (‘data subject’)” where “an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location 
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person” (GDPR ). 
50  Privacy by design is a methodological approach that supports the inclusion of privacy into the whole 
lifecycle of IT systems (Cavoukian 2009). 
51  The release of AOL web search data (Hansell 2006) and the Netflix competition (Narayanan & Shmatikov 
2008) are two popular examples of failed anonymisation. 
52  See, e.g. Apple’s announcement (Greenberg 2016). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Machine decision-making is set to become an increasing factor in our lives.  The calculation whether 
to adopt such technology may be driven by considerations of promised accuracy and efficiency gains, 
or simply by the attraction of downsizing and cost-savings.  Yet the social impacts of removing or 
reducing human interventions in decision-making that will impact individual rights and personal 
opportunities, as well as the collective good, will be wide-ranging. To date, the speed of adoption of 
such technologies in sensitive administrative and criminal decision-making processes has clearly 
outpaced evaluation of, and reaction to, those impacts.  Contemporary research raises issues as 
diverse as the deskilling and devaluation of certain types of employment, e.g. social workers become 
call centre workers (Eubanks 2018); loss of social connection, critical judgement and empathy as 
decisions become divorced from personal interactions (Turkle 2015); and social exclusion of the 
poorly educated or those in poverty who lack the resources to identify, understand and challenge 
system errors and failings (Eubanks 2018). 
This chapter addresses one of these impacts: where algorithms make decisions that seek to evaluate 
individual persons for the purposes of making a decision about their entitlement to some tangible 
benefit or burden, it is essential that those decisions and the system within which they are made 
remain capable of incorporating and acting upon appropriate normative principles and obligations.  
While machine decisions are often judged based solely on their accuracy, in such circumstances 
there are wider normative considerations.  Thus, the use of machine learning-based decision-making 
in criminal justice decisions about bringing criminal charges, length of prison sentence, eligibility for 
parole; or state administrative decisions about child safeguarding and eligibility for welfare benefits 
differs fundamentally from its use in other spheres, even those that may also have a positive or 
negative impact on individuals, such as medical diagnosis decisions.53  
This chapter reviewed some technical aspects of machine decisions and suggests that when seeking 
to develop or maintain a trust framework that supports the social legitimacy of criminal justice or state 
administrative decision-making systems using machine decision-making, it is helpful to do so by 
reference to key representative benchmarks.  Such benchmarks are common to consequential 
decision-making relating to individuals, and critical to development of appropriate trust relations 
between stakeholders, and include accuracy, transparency/accountability, fairness/equal treatment, 
and rights to privacy/free expression.  They reflect the main tracks around which research 
communities have articulated the main social and ethical implications of learning algorithms in the big 
data context (e.g. Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency in Machine Learning (FAT/ML) 
scholarship). In a similar vein, Mittelstadt et al. (2016) have framed the discourse with a distinctive 
vocabulary highlighting both epistemic and normative concerns.  
Each of these benchmarks may incorporate a multitude of interrelated aspects: legal concepts, 
metrics, (technical and legal) procedures, values, rights, existing laws, pragmatic concerns, etc. In this 
paper we have tried to demonstrate some of the connections between these aspects to shed light on 
the variety of (human) choices involved in the design, assessment and deployment of such systems 
(e.g. dealing with fairness requires consideration for different notions of equality and, in some 
contexts, existing laws, understanding of distinct technical criteria and techniques, etc.). Choosing 
which set of notions or procedures to follow calls for in-depth analysis, assessment of commitments 
and delicate balance.  Of course, the benchmarks identified here do not exist independently of one 
another. Rather they are in constant interaction and many problems arise out of their fuzzy 
boundaries, consider the use of sensitive data in decision making and the risk of discrimination. This 
also has consequences for the search for, and the implementation of, remedies for particular 
problems, e.g. an intervention on data protection/privacy may impact negatively on concerns 
regarding fairness. 
It is recognised that while ‘trust’ is frequently referenced when members of a society are affected by 
the deployment of novel infrastructures, such as socio-technical systems, the precise meaning and 
nature of trust has been debated and contested at length in the social sciences literature. We 
                                                          
53  As opposed to medical treatment decisions – whether a person has a particular form of cancer is a 
different question to whether the person should receive treatment for the cancer, and if so, what that 
treatment should be. 
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appreciate that the brief discussion here of the relationship of trust/distrust to the legitimacy of criminal 
justice or state administrative decision-making systems, and to the utility of the suggested 
benchmarks, cannot begin to do justice to that literature. Nevertheless, we would argue that the 
inclusion of the normative principles and obligations reflected in the benchmarks is critical to the 
social acceptance of those systems. The principles and obligations provide rational grounds to 
engage with such decision-making systems and to accept their decisions: providing a reason to trust.  
They also facilitate meaningful criticism and oversight of decision-making processes within those 
systems: permitting the ability to distrust. 
Most of the social and ethical issues raised by these benchmarks have also been tackled by Oswald 
et al. (2018), who developed a framework (ALGO-CARE) drawing on the experience of Durham 
Constabulary. The framework translates key ethical and legal principles in considerations and 
questions for supporting the assessment of predictive tools like HART. We hope that this paper can 
contribute to the discussion and the development of guidelines like ALGO-CARE with a synthesis of 
relevant technical and legal notions.  A purely algorithmic solution to these problems is not likely to be 
sufficient, as many of these problems require the development of legal and cultural tools and available 
metrics cannot capture the entire spectrum of human values and principles. Our ambition was to 
disclose important parts of the process implied in assessing our trust in machine decision-making, 
and to make accessible some conceptual tools that are necessary to approach the issues raised by 
machine learning algorithms.  
Acknowledgments. Teresa Scantamburlo and Nello Cristianini were funded by the ERC Advanced 
Grant ThinkBIG. 
  
23 
 
References 
Angwin J, Larson J, Mattu S & Kirchner L (2016) Machine Bias. ProPublica, 23 May 2016. 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing  
Baraniuk, C. (2017) Durham Police AI to help with custody decisions, BBC Online, 10 May 2017. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39857645 
Barnes G (2016) Focusing Police Resources: Algorithmic Forecasting in Durham, presentation at the 
9th International Conference on Evidence-Based Policing, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 16 July 2016. 
Barocas S & Selbst A (2016), Big Data’s Disparate Impact, California Law Review 104(3):671-732. 
Barry-Jester, A M, Casselman, B & Goldstein D (2015) The New Science of Sentencing. Should 
Prison Sentences Be Based on Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed Yet? The Marshall Project 4 
August 2015. 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing  
Berk R (2012) Criminal Justice Forecasts of Risk. A Machine Learning Approach. New York: Springer. 
Berk R, Heidari H, Jabbari S, Kearns M & Roth A (2017) Fairness in Criminal Justice Risk 
Assessments: The State of the Art, Sociological Methods & Research [online] 2 July 2018. 
Big Brother Watch (2018) Police use Experian Marketing Data for AI Custody Decisions. 6 April 2018. 
https://bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/all-media/police-use-experian-marketing-data-for-ai-custody-decisions/  
Burrell J (2016) How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine learning algorithms. Big 
Data & Society: 1-12. 
Caliskan A, Bryson JJ & Narayanan A (2017) Semantics derived automatically from language corpora 
contain human-like biases Science 356(6334):183-186. 
Chouldechova A (2017) Fair prediction with disparate impact: A study of bias in recidivism prediction 
instruments, arXiv: 1703.00056  
Christin A, Rosenblat A & boyd d (2015) Courts and Predictive Algorithms, Data & Civil Right: A new 
Era of Policing and Justice. 
http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027/Courts_and_Predictive_Algorithms.pdf  
Datta A, Tschantz MC & Datta A (2015). Automated experiments on ad privacy settings. Proceedings 
on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015 (1): 92-112. 
https://content.sciendo.com/view/journals/popets/2015/1/article-p92.xml  
Dwork C (2006), “Differential Privacy”, In: Bugliesi M., Preneel B., Sassone V., Wegener I. (eds) 
Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 4052. 
New York: Springer. 
Dwork C, Hardt M, Pitassi T, Reingold O & Zemel R (2012) Fairness through awareness. Proc. ACM 
ITCS 2012, 214-226. 
Dwoskin E (2015) How Social Bias Creeps into Web Technology. Software can lead to unintended 
errors, potentially unfair outcomes, The Wall Street Journal, 21 August 2015. 
Dressel J & Farid H (2018) The accuracy, fairness, and limits of predicting recidivism. Science 
Advances 4(1) 17 January 2018. 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5777393/  
Duhigg, C. (2012) How companies learn your secret. New York Times, February 16, 2012. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html 
Eubanks V (2018) Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor, 
New York: St Martin's Press. 
Feeley M & Simon J (1994) Actuarial justice: The emerging new criminal law. In: Nelken D (ed) The 
futures of criminology. London: Sage, 173–201. 
24 
 
Friedman B & Nissenbaum H (1996), Bias in Computer Systems. ACM Transactions on Information 
Systems, 14(3):330-347. 
Gosepath, S "Equality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/  
Hansell S (2006) AOL removes search data on vast group of web users. New York Times, August 8, 
2006. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/08/business/media/08aol.html  
Hardt M (2014). How big data is unfair. Understanding unintended sources of unfairness in data 
driven decision making. Medium, September 26, 2014. 
https://medium.com/@mrtz/how-big-data-is-unfair-9aa544d739de  
Hardt M, Price E & Nathan S (2016) Equality of opportunity in supervised learning. In: Lee DD, 
Sugiyama M, Luxburg UV  Guyon I and Garnett R. (eds) Advances in Neural Information Processing 
Systems 29. arXiv:1610.02413. 
http://papers.nips.cc/paper/6374-equality-of-opportunity-in-supervised-learning  
Hellman D (2016). Two Concepts of Discrimination. Virginia Law Review 102(4):895-952 
Hurley D. (2018) Can an Algorithm Tell When Kids Are in Danger? New York Times Magazine, 
January 2, 2018. 
Kleinberg J, Ludwing J & Mullainathan S (2016), A Guide to Solving Social Problems with Machine 
Learning, Harvard Business Review, 8 December 2016 
https://hbr.org/2016/12/a-guide-to-solving-social-problems-with-machine-learning  
Kleinberg J, Lakkaraju H, Leskovec J, Ludwig J & Mullainathan S (2017) Human Decisions and 
Machine Predictions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(1): 237-293. 
Kleinberg J, Mullainathan S & Raghavan M (2017) Inherent trade-offs in the fair determination of risk 
scores. In: Papadimitriou CH (Ed.) 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference 
(ITCS 2017) Article No. 43. arXiv:1609.05807 
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/8156/pdf/LIPIcs-ITCS-2017-43.pdf  
Kroll JA, Huey J, Barocas S, Felten EW, Reidenberg JR, Robinson DG & Yu H (2017) Accountable 
Algorithms, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 165(3): 633-705. 
Larson J, Mattu S, Kirchner L & Angwin J (2016), How we analysed the COMPAS recidivism 
algorithm. ProPublica, May 23, 2016. 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm/  
Lazer D, Kennedy R, King G, & Vespignani A (2014) The Parable of Google Flu: Traps in Big Data 
Analysis. Science 343(6176):1203-1205. 
Liptak A (2017) Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithm. New York Times, 1 May 
2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-secret-
algorithms.html  
Lipton Z (2018) The Mythos of Model Interpretability, ACM Queue 16(3). arXiv:1606.03490 
https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3241340  
McIntyre N & Pegg D (2018) Councils use 377,000 people's data in efforts to predict child abuse. The 
Guardian, 16 September 2018.  
Mitchell T (1997) Machine Learning, New York: McGraw-Hill 1997. 
Mittelstadt B, Allo P, Taddeo M, Watcher S & Floridi L (2016) The Ethics of Algorithms: mapping the 
Debate. Big Data & Society 3(2): 1-21. 
  
25 
 
Moore, R ed. (2015) A compendium of research and analysis on the Offender Assessment System 
2009–2013, NOMS, Ministry of Justice, July 2015. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/research-and-analysis-on-the-offender-assessment-
system 
Narayanan A & Shmatikov V (2008) Robust De-anonymization of large Sparse Datasets, Proceedings 
of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy: 111-125. arXiv:cs/0610105 
Oswald M, Grace J, Urwin S & Barnes GC (2018) Algorithmic risk assessment policing models: 
lessons from the Durham HART model and ‘Experimental’ proportionality, Information & 
Communications Technology Law, 27(2): 223-250. 
Paine J (2017) 10 Companies Using Technology to Disrupt the Lending Industry, Inc.com, August 25, 
2017. 
https://www.inc.com/james-paine/10-companies-using-technology-to-disrupt-the-lendi.html 
Romei A & Ruggieri S (2013) A multidisciplinary survey on discrimination analysis. The Knowledge 
Engineering Review 29(5): 582-638. 
Selingo J (2017) How Colleges Use Big Data to Target the Students They Want, The Atlantic, April 
11, 2017.  
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/04/how-colleges-find-their-students/522516/ 
Sweeney L (2002) K-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, International Journal on Uncertainty, 
Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10(5): 557-570. 
Sweeney L (1997) Weaving Technology and Policy Together to Maintain Confidentiality. Journal of 
Law, Medicine & Ethics 25(2&3): 98-110. 
Sweeney L (2013) Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, Communication of the ACM, 56(5): 44-54. 
arXiv:1301.6822 
Sulleyman, A. (2017) Durham Police to use AI to predict future crimes of suspects, despite racial bias 
concerns, The Independent, 12 May 2017. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/durham-police-ai-predict-crimes-
artificial-intelligence-future-suspects-racial-bias-minority-report-a7732641.html 
Tashea J (2017) Courts are using AI to sentence criminals. That must stop now. Wired. 17 April 2017 
https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/  
Turkle S (2015) Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age, New York: Penguin 
Press. 
Urwin S (2016) Algorithmic Forecasting of Offender Dangerousness for Police Custody Officers: An 
Assessment of Accuracy for the Durham Constabulary. Master’s Thesis, Cambridge University, UK  
http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/alumni/theses/Sheena%20Urwin%20Thesis%2012-12-2016.pdf  
Vapnik V (1995) The Nature of Statistical Learning Theory. New York: Springer Verlag. 
Wexler R (2017) Code of Silence, Washington Monthly, August 2017. 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaugust-2017/code-of-silence/  
Executive Office of the President (2016) Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity and 
Civil Rights, May 2016. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_data_discriminati
on.pdf 
Williams KR & Grant SR (2006) Empirically Examining the Risk of Intimate Partner Violence: The 
Revised Domestic Violence Screening Instrument (DVSI-R) Public Health Reports 121(4): 400 - 408. 
Winston A (2018) Palantir has secretly been using New Orleans to test its predictive policing 
technology. The Verge 27 February 2018. 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/27/17054740/palantir-predictive-policing-tool-new-orleans-nopd  
26 
 
Zafar MB, Valera I, Rodriguez MG, & Gummadi KP (2017). Fairness beyond disparate treatment & 
disparate impact: Learning classification without disparate mistreatment. Proceedings of the 26th 
International Conference on World Wide Web: 1171-1180. arXiv:1610.08452 
Zliobate I (2015) A survey on measuring indirect discrimination in machine learning. arXiv:1511.00148  
 
